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Abstract
The women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda is considered by many a feminist international agenda. This
note argues that the contrary. This note will attempt to argue that the WPS agenda may in fact undermine
the global international law feminist movement as opposed to furthering it. The view in this article is that
WPS agenda is in fact a human rights positive law carve out dressed as a feminist carve out.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I will inquire into whether the Women, Peace and Security (“WPS”) agenda
is—normatively and conceptually—a feminist international law proposition.
In the first instance, I will deconstruct the rights and duties included within the WPS
resolutions and which states are called upon to observe. I will also characterize the nature of those
rights (sine ira et studio). I will then briefly sketch the main arguments for the feminist critique of
international law showing the major propositions proffered by the feminist legal academy. Finally,
I will map-out the WPS agenda on the broader landscape of the feminist theory of international
law, with the aim of juxtaposing both legal structures, seeing whether the former fits within the
normative boundaries of the latter.
I will argue that the normative and conceptual foundations of the WPS agenda have a
positivist point of departure; in my opinion the WPS agenda seeks to reinforce women’s rights in
a human rights framework that is largely derived from already existing—positivist—international
human rights law and general international law instruments and norms. Therefore, I will
demonstrate that, the WPS agenda is not a small planet in the larger universe of the feminist
deconstruct of international law, on the contrary, it is a small planet in the already existing lex lata
of international human rights.
The public conceptual baggage that comes with the WPS agenda is that; the agenda is a
smaller part of a larger international law transformative critical theory (a small part of an already
fragmented pluralistic international law discourse), that aims to deconstruct the current
international law discourse and reconstruct it again in a different manner.1 While I see the
importance of critical legal studies, they are often conceived by international lawyers as
theoretical, academic, aspirational, and hard to realize.2 Confining the WPS agenda as a part of a
larger feminist theory negatively impacts the prioritization and the realization of the former, and
at the same time, undermines the canon of the scholarship of the latter.
Separating the WPS agenda from the broader feminist canon of scholarship will; on the one
hand, advance the WPS agenda as a human rights based agenda, seeking to protect women’s rights
(in separation from the conceptual transformative baggage that is usually attached to the feminist
approach); and on the other hand protect the feminist approach from being reduced to a mere
“right” seeking approach, bootstrapped in the current international law construct with its formal
sticky sources. Therefore, it is for the best to separate the WPS agenda from the larger feminist
critique and approach to international law—this does not thwart feminist scholars from supporting
the WPS agenda, but rather support knowing that it is not really a feminist agenda.
To formulate my arguments, this essay will proceed as follows. Part I sets the foundation
for my argument. In Part I, I will unpack the main concepts of the WPS agenda and trace those
concepts to their international law instrumental origins, in doing so, I will try to elaborate on the
main meta-principles that the WPS agenda aims to advance. I will also analyze the legal status of
the main instrumental foundation of the WPS agenda. For the purposes of this essay, I will focus
my study on the United Nations Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1325 (2000)
(“Resolution 1325”).
In Part II, I will sketch the main normative and conceptual foundations of the feminist
critical theory and underscore the main legal arguments that are proffered by the feminist critical
legal academy. I will underscore that the normative core of the feminist theory is not “right”
acquiring, but rather moral and transformative (not one calling for more rights, but one calling for
a true change). Nothing in Part I and II should be controversial.
In Part III, I will map-out the WPS agenda onto the broader landscape of the feminist critical
theory and elaborate on where I think tension occurs and where the dichotomy takes place between
the two. My main argument in this section will be that while the WPS agenda, facially, seems like
1

Steven Ratner, Ethics and international law: integrating the global justice project(s), 5:1 INTL. THEORY,
CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS (2013), 1-34, 7 (2013).
2
Id, at 8-9; See e.g., Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’, RECUEIL
DES COURS DE L’ ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 217 (1994); See also Bruno Simma & Andreas L.
Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals For Human Rights Abuses In Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View,
93:2 AJIL 302 (1999).
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a feminist agenda, both constructs have multiple points of tension among them. The first major
point of tension that I posit is relates to the normatively different points of departure; while the
WPS agenda accepts the lex lata as is (actually its acceptance of the formal legal sources of law is
axiomatic since it is a creature of those sources), the feminist agenda seeks to overthrow this lex
laxta by proposing a normatively different vision of the legal system a lex ferenda. The second
major tension finds its roots in the ultimate goals of both; the WPS traces women’s marginalization
to rights. The feminist approach refuses—as a matter of principle—the rights approach and seeks
a transformation that cures the inextricable gender power imbalances in the international legal
system. Finally, in Part IV, I will provide a conclusion for my essay.

2. THE WPS AGENDA
In this part of the essay, I will dissect Resolution 1325 (2000) and distil its underpinning
normative foundations, and their relation to the pre-existing legal sources. I will also argue that
the WPS agenda is a positivist agenda derived from formal legal sources. In fact, the relationship
between the WPS agenda and the existing formal legal sources can be described as axiomatic;
absent the formal legal sources, there would be no agenda.
The WPS agenda came into light in the year 2000. Resolution 1325 is seen, by many 3, as a
significant milestone in women’s activism and their push to change gender power dynamics in
general, and more specifically in armed conflict, and post-armed conflict reconstruction.
Resolution 1325 is a Security Council thematic resolution adopted under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. The simple idea behind 1325 is that “… peace is only sustainable if women are fully
included, and that peace is inextricably linked with equality between men and women”.4
The main themes and normative underpinnings of Resolution 1325 can be grouped into
three broad categories; (1) impact of armed conflict on women (specifically brute sexual violence
as a weapon of war); (2) importance of women participation in conflict resolution and post-conflict
peacebuilding; and (3) peacekeeping operations and women: training peacekeepers and
streamlining gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations.5 Those main themes conform with
the four pillars of the WPS agenda; (1) prevention; (2) participation; (4) peacebuilding; and (5)
recovery.6 As would be expanded upon infra, I agree with the viewpoint that postures 1325 as a
human rights resolution aimed at promoting the rights of women among within the general human
rights framework.7
Adopted under Chapter VI of UN Charter (pacific settlement of disputes), the enforceability
and binding nature of Resolution 1325 is highly contested. Most legal scholars argue that only
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter have a coercive element to them and
therefore are binding on member states.8 On the other hand, it is also argued that Chapter VI
resolutions should also be observed by the UN members.9 In my opinion, the operative paragraphs
See generally Catherine O’ Rourke, Feminist Strategy in International Law: Understanding its Legal,
Normative and Political Dimensions, 28 EJIL, 1019 (2017) (Discussing the development of the WPS agenda
and showing at some instances that the WPS agenda may be considered as a success—in the viewpoint of
some feminist scholars—for the international law feminist critical movement)
4
CYNTHIA ENLOE, A GLOBAL STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 1325, PREVENTING CONFLICT TRANSFORMING JUSTICE SECURING PEACE, 29 (2015)
5
S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. SCOR, 1,2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (2000).
6
Enloe supra note 4, at 28.
7
A GLOBAL STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325,
PREVENTING CONFLICT TRANSFORMING JUSTICE SECURING PEACE, supra note 4, at 15 (2015)
8
E.g., W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis of the United Nations, 87:83 AJIL, 83; See also Fernando
Teson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 323 (1996).
9
See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ REP. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21);
Christine Chinkin & Madeleine Rees, Commentary on Security Council Resolution 2467 Continued State
Obligation Action on Sexual Violence in Conflict, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE CENTER FOR WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY, 4. (However, it has been long pointed out, including
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), that article 25 makes no reference to Chapter VII but rather asserts
that “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter”. In the Namibia opinion the ICJ determined that article 25 could not
3
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of Resolution 1325 lack the binding language of UNSC resolutions, and therefore, 1325 is not
binding on member states.
Regardless of the binding element of Resolution 1325, one can trace the rights and duties
that, the UN member states, are urged and encouraged to respect and observe to either International
Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) or International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”). For example, operative
paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of Resolution 1325 mirror Customary International Law obligations on
the law of armed conflict.10 Operative paragraphs 7 and 8 can be traced directly to IHRL;
specifically they can be traced directly to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). Responding to the argument that tries to frame
WPS as a security agenda that ought to be observed only in times of conflict; first, both IHRL and
IHL are not mutually exclusive regimes, women’s rights under IHRL ought to be observed in
times of peace, and conflict;11 and second, Resolution 1325 has duties that do not squarely fit,
logically or legally, the boundaries of IHL.12
The WPS agenda, can therefore be argued, to exist in the overall framework of IHRL; “…
it must not be forgotten that the original Security Council resolution was fully conceived as being
part of the international tradition of human rights and that any interpretation of its provisions and
any strategies for implementation must be done with that in mind”.13 The CEDAW Committee in
General Recommendation 30 highlights the intersection between human rights and the WPS
agenda. The relationship has been described as follows:
26. All areas of concern addressed in those resolutions [including 1325] find expression
in the substantive provisions of the Convention, their implementation must be
premised on a model of substantive equality and cover all rights enshrined in the
Convention.
27. Using the reporting procedure to include information on the implementation of the
Security Council Commitments can consolidate the convention and the Council’s
agenda and therefore broaden, strengthen and operationalize gender equality.
In addition to the above provisions, General Recommendation 30 has other detailed
provisions related to the implementation of the WPS agenda in the broader context of CEDAW.
General Recommendation 30 is also noticeably clear on the extension of its reporting procedure
to the implementation of the WPS agenda by member states. Paragraph 83 of General
Recommendation 30 seeks to bring national implementation of the WPS agenda under the
supervision of the CEDAW committee and within the ambit of its monitoring mandate:
State parties are to provide information on the implementation of the Security Council
agenda on women, peace and security, in particular resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008),
1888 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2016 (2013), including by specifically reporting on
apply to Chapter VII resolutions with respect to UN enforcement action for if that had been the case “then
article 25 would be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter.); See also
ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 372-386 ( Hart
Publishing 2004) (2004).
10
Fourth Geneva Convention of, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, (Aug.
12, 1949). Women shall especially be protected against any attack on their honour, in particular, against rape
enforced prostitution, or any form of incident assault.
11
See Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Judgement 2005
I.C.J. Rep (19 December); See also: Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion 2004), 2004 ICJ REP. 595 (Advisory Opinion of July 9); See also
Common Article 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949
12
Those are more general recitations of women’s rights already existing in instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, and the Convention on
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. An example of those recitations that would not
possibly squarely fit in the IHL category would be operative paragraph 8 (c) of Resolution 1325: “Measures
that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to
the constitution, the electoral system, the police and judiciary;”
13
Enloe supra note 4, at 34.
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compliance with any agreed United Nations benchmarks or indicators developed as part of
the agenda.
After showing the relationship between Resolution 1325 and IHL and IHLR, I will now
proceed to examine the normative foundations of Resolution 1325. The normative foundations of
Resolution 1325 can all be traced to positivist formal sources of international law.
To positivists, law is an institutional social construct separate from social institutions, and
the one most single aspect of law making is state consent. Therefore, it has been observed that
formal sources of law form a unified legal system which has it own unique social construct, distinct
from and independent of other social institutions such as; morals, ethics, natural reason…etc.14 In
other words, it has been argued that formal sources make law an autonomous objective creature
living in isolation from the society that it hopes to regulate.15 Formal sources further accept
international law as it is (lex lata) and separates it from how it should be (lex ferenda).16 My
analysis of the underlying sources upon which the WPS agenda is constructed is that they are all
positivist formal legal sources. As I will posit in the next few paragraphs, the positivist school of
law is one that gives due regard to only formal sources of law, disregarding others. Therefore,
according to positivists, only formal sources can create law, and should be considered law.
In international law, the typical feature of—classic—positivism is the relationship between
law creation and state will or voluntarism. States create objective laws when they give consent to
norms.17 The Permeant Court of International Justice has opined on positivism and voluntarism in
the Lotus case by saying that:
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law
and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.18
Finally, looking at the international legal sources upon which the WPS agenda is
constructed, one can argue that all the sources conform to the definition of “formal legal sources”
from a positivist perspective. IHRL, CEDAW and IHL are all legal sources (whether treaty based
or custom based) that states have voluntarily assented to (whether expressly forming treaties or
tacitly forming custom), and which reflect the current lex lata. 19 One other—apparent—feature
of the WPS agenda is that it is an objective “rights” based agenda, with women foreseen as bearers
of those rights only.20
Having characterized WPS as a rights agenda built on positivist legal sources, I will now
move to Part II and examine the feminist critique of international law.

14

Simma & Paulus, supra note 2, at 4; See also H. L. A Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ of
Cal. Press 1967) (1960). Kelsen observed that: The Pure Theory of Law is Positive Law… It is called a
“pure” theory of law, because it only describes the law and attempts to eliminate from the object of this
description everything that is not strictly law: Its aim is to free the science of law from alien elements.
15
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
AJIL, 613, 613 (1991)
16
Simma & Paulus, supra note 2, at 4; Ratner supra note 1, at 3. According to Steven Ratner: As a consequence
[of positivism], many scholars write for an imagined audience, in particular a judicial one, that would
consider moral arguments ultra vires. They often move beyond description—what is the content of law—to
prescribe and advocate legal norms and institutions that we should support, but they generally do the latter
within a methodology that relies on accepted practices regarding sources and interpretation, with perhaps
occasional nod to political realities, or efficiency, to guide among competing choices.
17
See, Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AJIL 413 (1983). E.g., W. Michael
Reisman, Lassa Oppenheim’s Nine Lives, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 255 (1994).
18
S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)
19
Simma & Paulus, supra note 2, at 5; See Reisman supra note 17.
20
See generally Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15.
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3. FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this part of the essay, I will underscore the feminist discourse of international law and
highlight the main feminist arguments in critique of international law. I will further argue that the
feminist approach to international law strongly opposes positivism as a source of law. I will
proceed by first highlighting the major propositions of the feminist theory of international law,
and will then, secondly, proceed to show why feminism is conceptually, against positivism as a
source of law.
One of the major international law critical theories, is the feminist theory. In general, critical
approaches to international law aim to dismantle the current international law discourse, by
engaging with its building blocks and then reconstructing it again in a—foundationally—different
way (be it post-modern or otherwise).21 The common denominator for most critical legal
scholarship is that power has constituted and corrupted international law and therefore it ought to
be reformed in a way that takes into account the voices of those “marginalized for centuries”.22
Feminist scholars, beginning with the conceptual undergird laid-out by Hilary Charlesworth
and Christine Chinkin, saw that international law is “dominated by male views of society and
individuals…”.23 Examining the foundational blocks of the international legal order, they
concluded that certain a priori assumptions made by positivists reflect male biases.24 “At bottom
feminism is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, a way of asking
questions and searching for answers, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression
of women.”. 25 Reflecting the gender hierarchy foundations of the feminist theory, Bridget BrockUtne articulated that:
Though patriarchy is hierarchical and men of different classes, races or ethnic groups have
different places in the patriarchy, they are united in their shared relationship of dominance
over their women. And, despite their unequal resources, they are dependent on each other
to maintain the domination.26
There is a common pushback against the feminist critique of international law; this
pushback questions the relevance of the feminist approach to general public international law
issues such as state sovereignty, state responsibility and territory, as these issues appear to be
gender free in their construction and application.27 This, in fact, is where the tension occurs; the
feminist critical approach argues that flawed gender dynamics have been inextricably woven in
the fabric underpinning international law, making the law male like; Hilary Charlesworth has
argued that “if law is a ‘human artifact,’ is it not relevant that its makers are invariably men”. 28
Another argument proffered in this respect is that, while women are not completely absent from
the international legal order, they enter into focus in a very limited way; whether as mothers,
caregivers or victims.29

21

Ratner supra note 1 at 7; See generally B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World
Perspective, 112 AJIL, 1 (2018).
22
Ratner supra note 1 at 8; CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE 241-44 (1980).
According to Mackinnon: They have taken [Anglo-American Feminists] the task of deconstructing the
dominant masculine modes of speech and writing. “We must reinterpret the whole relationship between the
subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the
macrocosmic”.
23
HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTIN CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST
ANALYSIS (2000); See e.g., Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15
24
Ratner supra note 1 at 9; See generally CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 23.
25
Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15 at 614.
26
Brock-Utne, Women and Third World Countries—What Do We Have In Common?, 12 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L
F. 495, 500 (1989).
27
Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15 at 614.
28
Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods IN International Law, 93 AJIL 379, 392 (1999).
29
Id, at 381; Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15 at 641.
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One of the commonly used arguments by feminist scholars to sketch the gender biases in
international law is the various dichotomies that are imbedded in its structure to “factor out the
realities of women’s lives and build its objectivity on limited basis”. 30Among the dichotomies
used, is the public/private distinction; feminist scholars argue that this distinction separates the
“public” world of politics and state from the “private” world of home and family, where women
are usually of concern. The direct effect of this distinction can, for example, be seen in the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, adopted by the General Assembly in
1993.31 Hilary Charlesworth has commented on the Declaration by stating that it “makes violence
against women an international concern but refrains from categorizing violence against women as
a human rights issue in its operative provisions”32, this is seen by Charlesworth as a result of the
public/private distinction.
Another point of tension that the feminist academy highlights is between legal positivism
and the feminist approach to international law. As underscored in Part I supra, legal positivism
has two prongs: (a) what we accept as law is a matter of social fact, thereby, lex lata is separated
from lex ferenda (separating law as is from law as it should be); and (b) the one most fundamental
criteria for the validity of law is states’ consent, specifically through the process of custom or
treaty making.33
The feminist construct of international law (being a critique of the current discourse)
diametrically opposes the positivist construct. The feminist approach departs from a normative
point that may very well reject formal legal sources and finds law elsewhere. Describing critical
legal studies more generally, Martti Koskenniemi and Steven Ratner have posited that:
These approaches [critical methodologies] have not merely engaged with morality, but in
many ways put it at the center of their agenda. These approaches seek to identify hidden
agendas and biases within international law… and reform it… Where positivists saw
consent and acceptance, critical legal scholars saw power and hegemony; where positivists
saw international law as a language of communication, critical scholars’ lawyers seeking to
preserve their own relevance in a changing world 34
Besides the general tension between critical legal studies and positivism, the feminist
critical approach has specific criticism of positivism. In addition to rejecting the gender power
dynamics embedded in international law, feminist scholars are very skeptical of the manner in
which formal sources of law are created.35 From a feminist perspective, the patriarchal structure
of states is represented on the international legal order; women are excluded from elite positions
and the law making process (state consent and voluntarism) is overwhelmingly dominated by
males.36 The formal legal sources produced from those law-making process are, therefore, by their
very conceptual nature opposed by feminist scholars.
Take for example IHL; while the Geneva Conventions extend special protections to women,
the Geneva conventions are also seen to reinforce the idea of the “warrior’s honor” and further
reinforce the male perspective of woman as a bearer of rights but not necessarily equal. 37
Describing the tension between the feminist critical construct and positivism—as a source
of law— Hilary Charlesworth has posited that:

30

Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 382.
GA Res. 48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1049 (1994).
32
Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 382.
33
Ratner, supra note 1, at 3; See generally Stephan Hall, The Persistent Specter: Natural Law, International
Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EJIL 269 (2001).
34
See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989); Ratner, supra note 1 at 7; David
Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against The Box, 32 N. Y. U. J. INT’L L. 335, 355 (2000).
35
O’ Rourke, supra note 3 at 1027; See generally ALAN E. BOYLE & CHRISTIN CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
36
Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15 at 622.
37
Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 386.
31
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unlike these other methods [including positivism], my account of feminism asserts the
importance of gender as an issue in international law: it argues that the idea of “femininity”
and “masculinity” are incorporated into international legal rules and structures, silencing
women’s voices and reinforcing the globally observed domination of women by men. None
of the other methodologies represented… displays any concern with gender or, indeed, with
the position of women as an international issue. 38
To wrap up this part of the essay, it is clear that there is a conceptual tension between the
feminist approach to international law, and positivism as theory explaining sources of law. This
tension is not a minor one that can be reconciled, it is a major tension that questions what ought
to be considered law and where the origins of law can be traced to. The feminist approach seeks
to overthrow the status quo, while legal positivism is grounded in the status quo.

4. WPS FROM A FEMINIST LENS
After examining the legal nature of the WPS agenda, and after laying out the basic
foundations of the feminist critical theory, I will now argue that while the WPS agenda, on its face,
seems to be advancing the goals of the feminist critique. In reality, it actually undermines the metaprinciples of the feminist approach and its transformative goals. The dichotomy between WPS and
feminism starts at positivism as a point of departure, but it does not end there. Therefore, I will
further argue that associating the WPS agenda with the broader feminist agenda, may pose a risk
of reducing the latter to a mere rights seeking agenda bootstrapped in sticky procedural rules.
Another point of tension that I can possibly foresee between WPS and feminism is that WPS could
be seen as a wedge creating more fragmentation to women’s rights in general, and thus weakening
the foundational structure of women’s righst.
The first point of tension between the WPS agenda and the feminist approach to
international law is that the WPS accepts law as is (lex lata), while the feminist agenda proposes
a different construct of how law should be, taking into account the position of women as a whole.
On the one hand, the WPS agenda seeks to secure more—human—rights for women under the
already existing framework constructed from formal—positivist— legal sources. On the other
hand, global justice and ethics—from a gender perspective—are at the center of the feminist
agenda.39 Due to their rejection of the current state of legal affairs (lex lata), often, critical legal
projects have been criticized for being far better at identifying the flaws of the international legal
system than offering a coherent theory for moving forward.40 Feminist scholars have proffered a
counterargument that questions the benefits of engaging within the current boundaries of the
international legal system, since its claimed objectivity is one that excludes women’s voices.
Feminist scholars further question the impartiality and neutrality of the current constructed
international law standards (the lex lata), as to them, it is seen to be coupled with male
perspectives.41 Therefore, the feminist academy proposes a radically different international legal
system operates against the backdrop of a normative moral foundation, even if it is attacked to be
aspirational or incoherent.
Describing the dominance of positivism, steven Ratner has argued that positivism remains
the “lingua franca” of international law.42 Bruno Simma, one of the major proponents of the
enlightened positivist school of thought, has argued that engaging with moral sources of law, such
as human rights, does not threaten positivism as long as the claimed norm relies on formal
sources.43 Feminist scholars have responded to enlightened positivists by arguing that even if the
positivist argumentation is based on human rights, as means of norm identification, “the traditional
canon of human rights law does not deal in categories that fit the experience of women”. 44 The

38

Id, at 392
Ratner, Supra note 1, at 8.
40
Id, at 9.
41
Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 392.
42
Ratner, supra note 1 at 3.
43
See generally Simma, supra note 2; see generally Simma & Paulus, supra note 2.
44
Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15 at 628
39
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WPS agenda on the other hand, accepts all formal sources of law as they are, without really
questioning or objecting their normative underpinnings.45
A second point of tension that exists between WPS and the feminist critique of international
law, is the WPS’s rights only approach. From a feminist perspective, the rights approach can
supplant the feminist agenda, imprisoning it into rights acquirement only. A pure rights agenda
reduces complex power relations in an over simplified way.46 Additionally, an agenda centered
only around rights, overlooks other major forms of oppression that operate within the cultural,
social, and economic realms.47 Even if acquiring small rights fits an overall feminist strategy,
those rights have been patched together into a Chapter VI resolution. The shadowy legal nature of
the Resolution 1325—as I have explained in Part I supra—casts doubts over its overall
effectiveness. 48
Imagine, mutatis mutandis, if the lex lata and the standing international system as a military
dictatorship, and the feminist academy as revolutionaries. The revolutionaries are not seeking a
change of government, a change of faces, or new civil rights laws. The revolutionaries know that
all cosmetic changes proposed, would still be contaminated by the disease infecting the core of
the system; there is a bad apple in the system, and regardless what the system produces the bad
apple is still there. What the revolutionaries want is to overthrow the regime in toto; the
revolutionaries do not, necessarily, have a problem with the laws and the rights being produced
per se, the revolutionaries have an ideological moral rejection of the regime and the norms its
holds itself upon, which are all embedded in the rights it accepts to give. The revolutionaries want
change, the regime wants to maintain the status quo and keep its power; therefore, the regime
agrees to give the revolutionaries some rights. Those rights are created in the image of how this
military dictatorship sees the world, and those rights are tainted by how the regime sees the
revolutionaries: outliers that ought to be silenced at the first opportunity, if not, then lets agree to
consider them as mere bearers of rights, but not really equals.
Now imagine even a more sinister military dictatorship, one that takes advantage of those
cosmetic rights and creates propaganda for itself; the revolutionaries are agents of anarchy, they
refuse to accept the rights that we are giving them. The military dictatorship understands that the
revolutionaries are not looking for participation, they want change; a true normative change. But
the military dictatorship is also aware that a true change would irreparably harm their interests,
and therefore, the only change they are willing to offer is participation based on their own
rulebook. Now, the question that lingers is: should the revolutionaries subscribe to those rights
and slowly be normalized and submerged into the system? Or, should they consider these rights
as political wins for the population at large (all the other citizens living in the state), but not as part
of their revolutionary struggle?

45

Rejections by feminist scholars also extend to question the political institutional process in which the WPS
resolutions were born; E.g., O’ Rourke, supra note 3. Catherine O’ Rourke observes that: The complicity of
Resolution 1325 with militarist state politics has been most forcefully articulated by Dianne Otto, as she
draws attention to the place of ‘thematic resolutions’ such as Resolution 1325 within the broader ‘muscular
humanitarianism’ of the UN Security Council and its need to develop a new raison d’etre in the aftermath
of the Cold War and the consequent danger of Resolution 1325 legitimating Security Council militarism.
Sheri Gibbings gives a powerful example of this dynamic in the reference of Resolution 1325 in the
preamble of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 on Iraq.
46
Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 15 at 635. Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright argue that: Right
discourse is taxed with reducing power relations in a simplistic way. The formal acquisition of a right, such
as the right to equal treatment, is often assumed to have solved an imbalance of power. In practice, however,
the promise of rights is thwarted by the inequalities of power: the economic and social dependence of women
on men may discourage the invocation of legal rights that are premised on an adversarial relationship
between the rights holder and the infringer… the invocation of right of sexual equality may therefore solve
an occasional case of inequality for individual women but will leave the position of women generally
unchanged.
47
Id.
48
O’ Rourke, supra note 3, at 1023; See generally Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of
Crisis, 65 MOD. L. REV. 377 (2002).
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Travelling from the world of military dictatorships and revolutionaries back to international
law; In my opinion, the WPS agenda may be a good political win, but it should not be used by the
international community, or the legal academy, as a “favor” or an act of “courtesy” against the
broader feminist—transformative—agenda. The WPS agenda is neither transformative nor
feminist.
One final point of tension that I see between the WPS agenda and the feminist agenda is
that the WPS agenda poses a risk “fragmenting” and “proceduralizing” women’s right and creating
negative externalities on the broader feminist agenda. I will elaborate below on those two ideas:
First the issue of fragmentation: The international legal system, at the moment, is being
increasingly fragmented.49 Such fragmentation has raised many questions about the relationship
between the created sub-regimes and their impact on public international law.50 Powerful states
may pursue legal fragmentation—or look favorably upon it—to circumvent observance of their
legal obligations. 51 The implications of this fragmentation are of concern to the feminist academy.
52
A highly fragmented international regime of gender norms raises questions of responsibility and
enforceability;53 who has the responsibility to monitor and who has the responsibility to enforce?
In a fragmented regime, treaty bodies and states may have better chances of making legal moves
to circumvent responsibility and estop enforcement. Feminist international lawyers have argued
that the current general trend is that gender norms emerge from fora that are either less
representative (including only a group of likeminded states), or less democratic, which makes
those emerging norms fragile against states and non-state actors. 54
Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs have articulated 4 fragmentation strategies for the
avoidance of international legal obligations:
(1) Avoid broad, integrative agreements in favor of a large number of narrow agreements
that are functionally defined; (2) formulating agreements in the context of onetime or
infrequently convened multilateral negotiations; (3) avoiding whenever possible the
creation of a bureaucracy or judiciary with significant, independent policymaking
authority and circumscribing such authority when its creation is avoidable; and (4)
creating or shifting to an alternative venue when the original one becomes too
responsive to the interests of weaker states and their agents. 55
In light of the fragmentation argument, one can reasonably reflect on whether the WPS
agenda, unlike human rights treaty monitoring system, makes accountability more diffusive which
in turn carries onto the commitment and enforceability of women’s rights at large. 56
49

The issue of Lex specialis and self-contained regimes is a very interesting topic that ought to be researched
in a separate paper. The intersections of general public international law and the feminist agenda also
requires a separate research independent of this essay
50
See MENNO T. KAMMINGA, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 72nd Conference of the International Law Association (2006); See also
Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L.533 (2002) ; See also Bruno Simma & Dirk Polkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Selfcontained Regimes in International Law, 17 EJIL 483 (2006). Simma & Polkowski argue that: A central,
and increasingly difficult task of the jurist consists in allocating authority in a system composed of both
elements of hierarchical unity and multiple network structures in diverse issue area.…
Lex specialis maxim as a tool for networking ‘traditional’ international law and ‘new’ subsystems of
international law. As international law has evolved into an elaborate, but fragmented, structure, in which
multiple regimes govern the same legal consequence
51
See Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation
of International Law, 60 STANF L. REV. 595, 600 (2007).
52
See also CATHERINE O’ROURKE & AISLING SWAINE, GUIDEBOOK ON CEDAW GENERAL RECOMMENDATION
NO. 30 AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 1, UN Women, 2015
(2015).
53
O’ Rourke, supra note 3, at 1028.
54
Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 35, at 124-125
55
Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 51, at 600-601.
56
O’ Rourke, supra note 3, at 1029.
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The second issue of proceduralization of women’s rights: the issue of proceduralization
flows directly from the issue of fragmentation. Being in the form of a UNSC resolution, the WPS
agenda has caused a legal stir: of how Resolution 1325 should be operated, whether if it is at all
binding, and who is responsible of overseeing its implementation. In 2013 the CEDAW
Committee adopted General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention and in conflict
and post-conflict situations. General Recommendation 30 gives retrospective legal status to the
WPS resolutions (1325, 1820, 1888, 1960, and 2016), General Recommendation 30 also seeks to
formally bring the domestic implementation of the resolutions under the monitoring of the
committee. General Recommendation 30 has been described to be reflective of a “longer-term
body of work… to bring domestic implementation of the resolutions under the purview of the
CEDAW’s formal mechanisms of state accountability”.57 On the one hand, inclusion of the WPS
agenda within the purview of the CEDAW committee can be seen as a guarantee of more
monitoring, enforceability and efficacy. On the other hand, it can be argued that General
Recommendation 30 reduces observing women’s rights to a set of institutional procedures and
may risk creating internal competition for resource and create political priority for rights that are
seen to be inherently natural to women. 58Additionally, associating WPS with the broader feminist
agenda, raises questions of extraterritoriality that are usually attached to CEDAW’s application in
foreign policy, and would place women’s rights extraterritorial application subject to legal
argumentation.59
In summary, what I have tried to demonstrate in this section is that the WPS agenda
advances women’s rights, but it is not necessarily a feminist agenda. The WPS could be
characterized as a human rights’ agenda but associating it with the feminist agenda does not serve
the interests of the feminist agenda at large.

5. CONCLUSION
The WPS agenda is, without a doubt, a significant win for women in the framework of
human rights, but this should not be translated as win for the feminist agenda at large. The feminist
agenda is a reformist agenda that questions the very law-making process, and “formal” legal
sources that brought the WPS agenda into life. Associating the WPS agenda with the
transformative agenda may undermine the ultimate goals of the feminist agenda and reduce it to
rights and legal procedures—thus avoiding the normative propositions that are attached to the
feminist agenda. In fact, the WPS agenda can be used against proponents of the feminist agenda
as proof of feminist transformation. This harms the feminist transformative project.
The feminist transformative project is not one that accepts the lex lata, it is one that in fact,
challenges the international legal system, its structure, the position of the legal units in this
structure and the allocation of authority among them.
Therefore, Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions forming the WPS agenda ought
to be, pragmatically, regarded as good political gains or wins—within the Security Council—that
create a good framework for women’s participation, protection and equality in a human rights
context. Nothing should prevent the feminist academy from lending its support to the
advancement of the WPS agenda, since the feminist approach—normatively—seeks to bring in
those who are marginalized due to gender power dynamics. However, the feminist academy must
also be aware that a revolutionary change does not equate giving some rights and letting go of
some power!

Id at 1031; See generally O’Rourke & Swaine supra note 52.
O’Rourke supra note 3 at 1032-1033
59
Id at 1032-1033.
57
58
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